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IRGC and Iranian Soft Power influence within the Middle east
By: Daryl F. Urbina

Abstract
The IRGC, or the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Iran have utilized soft power to
increase their influence within the Middle East. By using military superiority; ideological
influence; and trade, both the Iran and the IRGC established dependency between themselves
and patron states. Of these patron states, the research focuses on Iraq; Syria; and Yemen, and
how Iran and the IRGC affect them through soft power. This research suggests that Iran and the
IRGC is using the disability of the aforementioned states to increase their own influence by
making them dependent on Iranian military supplies; cultural indoctrination to align with Iranian
ideology; and economic dependent on Iran. As Iran’s influence grows within these states, its
power in the Middle East grows and becomes a security risk for Saudi Arabia; Israel; and any
other regime that does not have its interests align with the Iranian regime.
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Chapter I: Introduction
Thesis
Evidence suggests that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, or
the IRGC, is active in destabilized regions through the use of soft
power tactics in an attempt to garner greater regional influence. In
doing so, the IRGC is amassing influence in a global scale through
increased funding and improved political and economic relations
with state governments or non-state actors.
Iran has been ostracized by the international community for their
support of terrorist organizations that propagate war and their
ambitions to become a nuclear power. The international
community has also implemented policies against the Iranian
regime in order to force policy reform, as exemplified by economic
sanctions and political separation. In response to the international
communities’ attempt to influence Iranian politics, both the Iranian
regime and the IRGC utilize their presence in other countries to
counteract any political and economic loss. Through the use of
creating a greater military dependency; increased ideological
connection; and economic soft power with foreign countries, Iran
and the IRGC are creating clientele states to secure international
power. The following countries will be used in a case study
examination: Iraq; Syria; and Yemen. By analyzing the extent of
influence that the IRGC and Iran has to the aforementioned
vi

countries, the benefits of their relationship can establish a
correlation between the profiteering of their destabilized
government and Iran.
The significance of the topic
Since the fall of the former Soviet Union, there has been a
proliferation of civil wars in the global sphere. Typically, these
wars take place in regions that have low to moderate stability, such
as the Middle East. These areas have seen large migrants crisis that
have affected the world politically; socially; and economically. In
better understanding how foreign actors affect civil wars, e.g., the
prolonging of civil wars and greater disability, then the
international community can better understand how to react to civil
wars and the interests that foreign actors typically have. For
example, Iran has taken advantage of the civil conflicts that have
occurred in Iraq; Syria; and Yemen. They have garnered a large
inflow of power that could signify that sanctions and other counter
measures that aim to counter Iranian activities will not affect them,
because they have become self-dependent on their own means of
power accruement. With the amount of success that Iran has
achieved, this will also signify that they will continue their tactics
of profiting from the further destabilization of other countries by
establishing soft power dominance. Venezuela, which has one of
the largest petroleum reserves, is already receiving assistance from
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Iran and so are certain countries in Africa, e.g., Nigeria. These
interactions could become pre-cursers to further destabilization
within these areas that will have been planned by the Iranian
regime. By understanding Iran’s actions, there format can also be
used to understand the interaction that countries like Russia and
China have in areas of low stability, as well.
The Opinion of the Literature
The opinion of the literature that discusses Iran; the IRGC; and
their support for likeminded militia groups to gain increase power,
which causes Iran to become destabilized, is supportive of my
argument. One of the most essential themes that gives perceived
legitimacy to the domestic and international actions of the IRGC is
their role in the Iranian constitution and the ideology of the
exportation of their revolution1The IRGC was created to aid in the
Islamic Revolution that took place in 1979 and would be
maintained in order to over watch the actions of Iranian military
that served the Shah and to export the Islamic revolution to other
countries and protect it within Iran2. The interpretation of
protecting the revolution within Iran has been a point of contention
because the IRGC has transcended a militaristic guardianship role
and become a political and economic entity that works beyond the
control of the Iranian Government3. The Domestic role of the
IRGC has been one of suppression and violent intervention when it
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believes that the citizenry of Iran is beginning to make strides to
make their dissatisfaction known. The Basij organization, which is
a branch of the IRGC, has been tasked with policing Iranian cities
and maintaining peace and organization within the country4.
However, the Basij, which has poorly trained youths who are
driven by ideology to radicalize its members, has taken violent
countermeasures to counteract dissidents of the regime. This takes
the form of beatings; killings; and imprisonment of student
protesters; political opponents of the regime; and so on5. The
IRGC also has a foreign presence that is known as the Quds force.
The Quds force is tasked with the direct assistance of militia
groups that it deems to meet the requirements of support by the
Iranian government. This criterion usually is targeted towards
Shiite groups and militia groups that target Iran’s enemies, such as
the GCC states and the western world6. Quds is most active in
regions that have a large Shiite presence, e.g., Syria; Lebanon; and
Iraq, and their actions range in training; funding; dedication of
soldiers; arms trade; and so on7. Quds is also supporting
organizations that have similar interests such as their own. For
example, Quds funds Hamas, the defacto Gaza Strip government
that takes violent and illegal actions against Israel in order to vie
for freedom. Quds is also supporting the Houthi rebels because of
their military campaign against Saudi Forces and the attempt to
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overthrow the monarchy of Yemen. Quds even extends their
influence past Middle Eastern states and have a presence in South
America and in Eastern European countries8. The IRGC itself also
coordinates with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security in order
to gather intelligence to give guidance to the Basij; the IRGC; and
the Quds force9. The power dynamic of the IRGC is growing as the
Iranian regime continuously gives power to the IRGC. Currently,
the IRGC relies on the Iranian regime as its legitimacy as an
organization stems from the legitimacy for the Iranian regime. But
while the IRGC has a firm grip on the domestic policies of Iran, its
expansionist policies has promulgated destabilization throughout
the Middle East, specifically: Iraq; Syria; and Yemen. Within all
three states, the IRGC has focused on its usage of soft power to
establish patronage between the aforementioned states with both
the IRGC and Iran. Through the use of the IRGC’s exceptional
training and network of trade routes, it is able to supply weaponry
and training to organizations that fulfill their interests. The IRGC
has also exploited cultural links, e.g., religion, to garner support
within states and to use religion as an avenue to spread an justify
Iran’s revolutionary ideology and anti-western ideology. Through
economic soft power, the IRGC establishes bi-lateral trade
agreements that favor both itself and the Iranian regime by
establishing deals that sees a large inflow of Iranian products and
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IRGC business growth within a country. For example, Iraq imports
more Iranian products than Iran imports Iraqi products. The IRGC
also uses its construction companies in an attempt to restore the
infrastructure of countries once war has subsided. With the IRGC
gaining substantial power through the use of soft power influence
internationally, it will most likely trade the use of hard power for
soft power in order to discreetly gain more influence. With regions
such as Venezuela; Nigeria; Tajikistan; and other unstable regions
that do not have international actors support their infrastructure,
Iran will be able to fill said position.
How the Topic fits
My topic fits in the literature by explaining the connection that Iran
and the IRGC have within the Middle East. I give special attention
to the IRGC because as an organization, it has the ability to
transcend the Iranian regime by achieving a level of self-autonomy
that is also free of international influence from non-state actors,
e.g., the UN and the World Bank. The IRGC has gained the most
influence when referencing the use of soft power in foreign
regions. This is because of the dependency that these states and
non-state actors form with the IRGC and not the Iranian regime
through the receiving of military aid; cultural influence; and
economic assistance. While the IRGC has the ability to transcend
other organizations, it is the domestic Iranian regime that is the
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largest obstacle. The IRGC is dependent on the relationship that it
has with the Supreme Leader, because the appointment of the
IRGC commander is decided by the Supreme Leader. In addition,
its legitimacy is linked to the Supreme Leader because its inception
was suggested by the former Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini. With the relationship between the IRGC and the Iranian
regime in consideration, it can be predicted that the IRGC will
attempt to consolidate power within their regime legitimately
through power and influence increase. This power increase can be
achieved through its increased presence within foreign states and
will create an avenue for further expansion domestically and
internationally. Wars such as the ones that took and that are
currently taking place in Iraq; Syria; and Yemen will also be
understood as concept models. This is because the accruement of
power that the IRGC and Iran has within the aforementioned states
follow a pattern that can be used to understand how the former and
latter will attempt to consolidate power in other foreign arenas.
Research Design
There will be five sections within this study. The Introduction will
be the proposal of my study and it will describe my thesis; the
significance of the topic; the current opinion of the literature; and
how my research affects the current literature. The second
paragraph will go over a brief overview of the IRGC; its structure;
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and its functions. Afterwards, the chapter will begin to discuss the
interests that the IRGC has within Iraq. The third and fourth
paragraph will follow a similar design to the Iraq chapter, as all
three will focus on the IRGC and the Iranian regime’s soft power
influence within the aforementioned states. At the end of the first;
second; and third chapter will be a historical chronological order
will discuss the evolving level of influence that both Iran and the
IRGC has had within said nation-states. The conclusion of the
research will begin by answering the research question through a
synthesis of the findings of the first; second; and third case study.
Then a synopsis will be given regarding the case studies and their
findings. The conclusion will end with a perspective on the future
outlook of the countries that the IRGC is present in and of the
growth of the IRGC, as well.
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Chapter II: IRGC: Nature; Forum; and Functions
The History of the IRGC
Brief Summary of its changing nature
Kenneth Katzman is the first contemporary scholar to publish
detailed research on the IRGC.10 The IRGC has attempted to
solidify its legitimacy with the rationale that it is the defender of
the Islamic Revolution and for its role in reconstructing Iran after
the Iran-Iraq War11. The IRGC was established originally to
monitor and replace the Artesh, which at this point was the
remained of the Shah’s military. It was on May 5, 1979 that
Ayatollah Khomeni declared the creation of Sepah-e Pasdaran-e
Enghelab-e Islami or the Army of the Guardians of the
Revolution12.
Goals
The IRGC is tasked with nine primary duties by the Revolutionary
Courts13:
1. Aiding the police and security forces in the removal of
counterrevolutionary
2. Combating counterrevolutionaries
3. Defense against foreign aggression
4. Coordinating with Iran’s armed forces
5. Training IRGC personnel in the expected moral, ideological, and
politico-military code
xiv

6. Assisting in the implementation of the Islamic Revolution
7. Supporting likeminded militia groups and oppressed Muslims.
8. To aid in catastrophic events
9.

promulgate the resources that the IRGC has at its disposal14
Structure
The Regular IRGC
After the creation of the IRGC, the new military organization was
tasked with not just phasing out the Shah’s Artesh force, but with
monitoring the Kurds of Iran and the communist Mujahedin force,
which posed as threats to the stability of Iran.15 The IRGC would
undergo skirmishes that became violent against the former and
latter, and this form of policing would persist even during the IranIraq war, or the great defense.16
During the Iran-Iraq War, the IRGC gained greater power as the
creation of the IRGC Navy and Air Force was authorized to aid in
the war effort. However, what caused the IRGC to gain the most
authority was their inclusion into the Iranian political field and
market. Ayatollah Khomeini believed that the IRGC should not be
involved in Iranian politics because it would undermine corrupt
IRGC interests from a militaristic organization to a politicized
military group1718. While the IRGC contested that their
constitutional objective of protecting the Islamic Revolution meant
that they needed a political presence, it was the ascension of
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Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that gave the IRGC the most political
power. When the former President Ali Khatami took office, his
reformist views became a threat to Khamenei and saw the IRGC
and the Basij force as allies due to symbiotic relationship of the
IRGC and Supreme Leader. That is when IRGC veterans began to
take positions in political offices in order to counteract the growing
influence of reformists1920.
During the 1992-1993 period, then President of Iran Rafsanjani,
proposed and allowed government entities, such as the IRGC, to
begin initiating their own business transactions to create separate
income2122. The IRGC created numerous business ventures that
ranges from construction companies to telecommunications, but
their most influential venture are bonyads, or foundations. Under
the foundations, the IRGC is able to distribute loans and other
forms of economic support to gain the favor of the populace and to
incentivize conscription and support for the IRGC23.
The IRGC has transitioned from a policy enforcing institution into
a policy creating institution. With the political; economic; and
social capabilities of the IRGC, it has amassed enough power
within Iran and abroad to challenge the government of Iran as the
dominant institution.
The Basij
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In order for the IRGC to fulfill its constitutional objective, the
IRGC established the Basij, which stands for Mobilization in
Persian, and the Quds force. The Basij force, a subordinate militia
of the IRGC, was established under the guises of being a program
for military training for Iranian citizens. This was to ensure that all
citizens would be able to defend Iran from any potential domestic
or foreign threat2425. Many Basij members were deployed
alongside the IRGC during the Iran-Iraq war and this would result
in the deaths of thousands, as Basij members received little to no
training26. While the Basij is expected to stabilize Iranian society,
it is often correlated with corruption and human rights violations27.
Most supporters of the Basij are hardliners who believe that the
Islamic Republic should follow a strong, theocratic approach to
government2829303132.
The Quds Force
The Quds force, or the Jerusalem force, which its fighters have
promised to liberate from Israel, was established to aid in the
IRGC’s constitutional obligation to aid in the exportation of the
Islamic Revolution33. The Quds force main area of operation is in
foreign theaters of conflict in which they offer training; equipment;
money; and troops support to like-minded militia groups34. The
Quds force has been active in Iraq by giving support and training
to the Shi’a militias of southern Iraq since the inception of their
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force. Iraq is of geographical importance to the Iranian regime
because it is a gateway to the Levant. The Levant itself is essential
to Iranian politics because of Lebanon; Israel; Palestine; and Syria.
Hizbollah, an important ally to Iran, is based in Lebanon; the
Assad regime supports Iran; HAMAS operates in the Gaza strip;
and Israel is an enemy of Iran35. Therefore, by Iran improving its
presence and coordination with Iraq, Iran is able to supply
Lebanon; Palestine; and Syria with resources. In addition, Iran’s
increasing influence in the Levant will put Israel at a greater state
of vulnerability, which will also allow Iran to pressure the United
States.
Intelligence: Ministry of Intelligence and Security
Little is known about Iran’s Intelligence and Security apparatus,
but their historical roots and adaptation from the Shah’s Sazman-e
Ettela’at va Amniat-e Keshvar, or SAVAK, organization can give
an improvised understanding of their function. SAVAK was
established by the assistance of both the United States and Israel
and its responsibilities would include countering internal
opposition and communists/leftist parties within Iran36. After the
1979 revolution, Iranian intelligence adopted the model
intelligence platform of the typical revolutionary group. This
included assassinating defectors and identifying internal opposition
movements and individuals for eventual eradication37. Iranian
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Intelligence was primarily constructed from tips and leads from the
Palestinian Liberation Unit and Kumitehs, which were established
by Ayatollah Khomeini to counter possible police forces that were
loyal to the Shah38. Eventually, the Revolutionary government
established various intelligence agencies, of which, Sazman
Ettela’at va Amniar Melli Iran, or SAVAMA, was the most
prestigious. SAVAMA was built on the foundation of SAVAK, it
would use the same methods of SAVAK to collect intelligence and
to conduct operations39. Eventually, a plethora of intelligence
offices would be formed and internal disarray began. In August
1983, the Iranian Parliament approved the formation of the Islamic
Republic of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security, or MOIS,
by combining the most experienced intelligence apparatuses40.
MOIS was tasked with developing an intelligence presence that
rivaled their enemies and were expected to target external enemies
of the Iranian Revolution41. One of the main objectives of MOIS is
to assist the IRGC in logistics; communication among the
operatives; and documents needed for their operations42.
The Power Structure of the IRGC
The IRGC and its influence is hypothetically dictated by complex
system of bureaucracy. The IRGC is commanded by the Joint
Armed Forces General Staff, which unites the IRGC and the
traditional Iranian military.
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Figure 143

The IRGC’s autonomy was reduced by the creation of the Ministry
of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics because it would mean
another institution that the IRGC had to be delegated by44. The
IRGC also is adjudicated by the Supreme National Security
Council. This council is compromised by the President; the
Defense and Foreign Ministers; the commander of the
Revolutionary Guards; and other representatives (Figure 2).
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Figure 245

Chapter III: IRGC and Iranian Socio-Economic Soft Power
Influence in Iraq
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The Importance of Iraq to the IRGC and Iran
Controlling Iraq is a key strategic necessity for Iran if it is to
increase its influence throughout the Middle East. Tactically, Iraq
is the gateway to the Levant for Iran, and with stronger
relationships with Iraq, Iran will be more apt to support Hezbollah;
the Assad Regime; target Saudi Arabia and Israel; and have
stronger relationships with Turley. Iraq’s majority population is of
Shi’a orientation and this is a common religious/cultural
background gives Iranian politics a pivot for control over Iraq.
Another important aspect regarding Iraq’s importance is its
Kurdish population in the North. By improving relations with the
Iraqi Kurds, Iran will be able to improve relations with the Kurds
that reside within Iran. The Kurdish population that resides in Iran
has been one of the most concerning domestic actors of Iran
because of the possibility to incite violence throughout multiple
regions. Iraq’s political alliance should be the most concern for
Iran because Iraq is currently considered an ally to the United
States. If Iran is to gain control of the Iraqi state, then it would
have secured its position in the Middle East even more simply be
removing an ally to the United States.
Military Power
Iranian Back Militias and Daesh
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In 2007, a report that focused on militia activity within Iraq has
stated that over 50 percent of attacks on coalition forces have been
supported by Iran46. Prior to the invasion of Daesh in Iraq, Iran
would supply and educate Shi’a militias on the various forms of
explosives that could be used against the American supported
coalitions. These explosives ranged in the forms of mortars;
roadside bombs; and IEDs47. Iran’s support of Shi’a militias was
direct, but it was not substantial enough to help the Shi’a majority
gain greater control of the Iraqi polity. What gave leeway to the
Iraqi Shi’as and Iran to have greater influence would be the arrival
of Daesh in Iraq. In 2014, Daesh, a Salifi terrorist organization that
has state interests invaded Iraq in 2014. Daesh began to target
Shi’a groups because they were declared as heretics against Islam,
or the more popular Sunni Islam. In response to the growing threat
of Daesh Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, an Iranian Cleric that oversees
religious duties in Iraq, made a Fatwa, or a religious declaration,
for Shi’a muslims to come together to fight back Daesh48.
The Popular Mobilization Unit
The Popular Mobilization Unit, or the PMU, a Shi’a militant group
was established as a result of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s fatwa49.
Just as previous Shi’a groups before the PMU, the IRGC oversaw
the organization’s funding; training; and coordination. As the fight
against Daesh continued, the PMU became the largest military unit
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in Iraq. It was considered so popular because the Shi’a population
felt galvanized to the military unit, as it was established by the
Shi’a for the Shi’a50. In addition, many recruits stated that the
PMU was a desirable alternative than the military of Iraq because
the PMU was considered less corrupt than the Iraqi army51.
Allegations of corruption are rampant in Iraq as stories such as
50,000 “ghost soldiers” who were on the government’s payroll but
did not physically exist are widely accepted52. The PMU is also a
popular alternative because PMU soldiers are paid higher wages
than they would if they were in the Iraqi military53. As years of
conflict continued, the PMU were able to play an important role in
liberating Iraq from Daesh. The PMU were so influential that the
Iraqi Parliament passed a law to transform the PMU into a
separate, official, and permanent military corps54. The PMU’s
popularity in Iraq became evident because the majority of the
Shi’a; Sunni; and Kurdish members of the Iraqi Parliamentarians
supported the PMU’s transition into a permanent military force55.
While the Iraqi paradigm has a positive perspective of the PMU,
there are certain concerns about the inclusion of the PMU into
Iraq’s military. One is that the PMU exists to defender and remain
loyal to a Shi’a centered Iraq56. Shi’a influence is on the rise in
Iraq and that is because sectarianism is becoming the primary form
of identity politics with Iraq, as nationalism no longer has much
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influence57. As a result, a stronger preference to the Shi’a identity
will give the IRGC a basis to increase their presence in Iraq
further. The PMU also has a regional role that is linked to Iran’s
interests to having increased influence over Iraq. The PMU will
give Iran further hegemonic goals that are rooted in economic;
political; and social dominance. The PMU will also have the
ability to bridge a political connection between Iraq and Iran
because PMU leaders will campaign in the national elections of
2018 and use their military experiences as a platform for their
campaign58. The PMU has the potential of transforming the power
influx of Iraq into a Shi’a dominated country, and with the help of
the IRGC, this is a likely possibility.
Political Influence
Since the fall of Saddam’s regime, Iran has attempted to increase
its influence within Iraq in order to destabilize the region through
the empowerment of the Shi’a majority. The objective is to create a
weak state that will amenable to Iranian influence. The Iraqi Shi’a
population is estimated to be around 60 percent, which Iran has
ensured to support through its Political Parties. IN addition, Iran
has supported Northern Iraqi Kurdistan politically to maintain a
strong relationship with Northern Iraq59. Iran has supported
political entities such as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, or
ISCI; the Badr Organization; The Islamic Dawa Party; and the
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Sadrists. Iran also advises and funds its preferred candidates during
parliamentary elections and in provincial elections, as it has done
in 2005; 2009; and 201060. In 2014, Nouri al-Maliki, the secretary
general of the Islamic Dawa Party and a Vice President of Iraq,
secured 94 seats in Parliament61. Nouri al-Malki is a close ally of
Iran, and his power over parliament translates to to greater Iranian
influence over the Iraqi polity. It should be expected that Iran will
play a greater role in Iraq’s 2018 parliamentary elections, as PMU
services members and other Iranian allies will find great support
from Iran. The historical connections between Iran and the
aforementioned parties is that the IRGC controlled and trained the
militias that belonged to the ISCI and the Badr Organization62. It
was after the fall of Saddam Hussein that former military members
of the ISCI militias and the Badr Organization returned to Iraq and
began to secure positions in the Iraqi ,military and political life.
Iran has become a powerful entity in the Iraqi polity, and as Shi’a
forces begin to gain greater political control, then the goal of a
united Shi’a state will become a reality and a powerful ally to both
Iran and the IRGC.
Ideological Infleunce
Religious Influence
Iraq, much like Iran, is ethnically compromised of a Shi’a
majority, which establishes a common ground between both
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aforementioned countries through religion. However, religious
leaders within Iraq, specifically Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, are
suspicious of Iran because of their desire to establish velayat-e
faghih, or rule of supreme jurisprudence from Iran63. While Iran’s
religious influence is too great within Iraq, the close proximity; the
large influx of pilgrims between countries; and growing authority
from the Shi’a majority within Iraq are few of many incentives for
Iran to change their lukewarm relations64. The obstacle that proves
to be the most bothersome to Iran is the Grand Ayatollah Ali
Sistani, as he holds a negative opinion towards growing Iraqi
influence within Iraq. Even though Sistani funds thousands of
religious scholars to study in Iran, the Ayatollah warns his
followers, who are 80% of the world’s Shi’a population, to be
wary of Iranian velayat-e faghih in Iraq65. In order to curtail the
negative feelings of a religious interconnection between Iran and
Iraq, Iran has begun to fund religious foundations; build religious
schools; mosques; and medical clinics in heavily concentrated
Shi’a regions within Baghdad; Najaf; and other Shi’a centers. The
Iranian regime has also been accounting to counter Ali Sistani in
the form of grooming other potential successors for the Ayatollah
passes. An example is low ranking clerics such as Seyyed
Mohamad Tabtabi promotes Iranian ideology within his sermons66.
However, regardless of Iran’s ambitions, they cannot ensure that
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they will have a replacement that is loyal to the regime when
Sistani passes, as his influence is not an appointed role, rather, his
power comes from emulation and respect conferred to him by
every Shi’a follower67. Iran has also used pilgrimages made by
Iranian Shi’a adherents into Iraq as a form to expand their
influence. This takes the form of the construction of tourist
facilities and the improvement of transit routes that are funded by
Iran. For example, Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the IRGC
Quds force, spear-headed the construction of a road from the
Diyala province into the Samarra province in Iraq, as a sign that
Iran is supportive of the local Shi’a population68.

Education
In the aftermath of the armed conflicts that occurred within Iraq,
Iran has offered to help improve the education system. Iran’s
Islamic Azad University is planning to open new branches within
Iraq, with Velayati, a senior advisor to Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei, has stressed that educational issues must be helped69.
The universities main focus is to create the next generation of
“Resistance,” which is a term that is correlated with those that fight
Israel, the United States, and other enemies of Iran70. The
university is anticipating in opening branches in Karbala; Najafl
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Basra; and Baghdad after both the Iranian and Iraqi regime signed
a memorandum71.

Media
After the fall of Saddam Hussain, Iranian television were some of
the first channels to reach the homes of Iraqis.72 By using
transmitters near the Iranian-Iraqi border, Iran has been able to
transmit programs that portray Iran as the protectors of Iraq from
foreign invasive forces73. With the use of these transmitters, Iran
can also broadcast other forms of materials that aims to persuade
the Iraqi public to form a positive opinion of the Iranian regime
and their interaction with the Iraqi polity. An example is Al-Alam,
a 24 hour news program that broadcasts news from the Iranian
perspective that exploits the ever changing political landscape74.
Economic Soft Power
IRGC Economic Apparatuses
In seeking to control all areas of Iranian society, the IRGC has
taken the appropriate measures to increase its economic control
over the Iraqi domain. It is reported that the IRGC controls up to
one sixth of the declared GDP of Iran75. The sectors that the IRGC
operates in, but are not limited to banking; telecommunications;
oil; gas; and construction76. Of the most influential companies that
is under IRGC control is the engineering firm, Khatam al-Anbya
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Construction Headquarters. This construction company has stated
that it has completed over 1,800 projects77. The IRGC would also
have control of economic organizations that were established from
the confiscation of wealth from the upper class and pre-Shah
institutions78. The IRGC would control foundations, or bonyads,
that are tax-exempt; government subsidized; and populist led
organizations. Examples of these bonyads that are under the
control of the IRGC are the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans
Affairs and the Foundation of the Oppressed79. Some of the most
recently established foundations are the IRGC Cooperative
Foundation, which was formed by IRGC commanders to structure
the IRGC’s investments80. The IRGC Cooperative Foundation has
also established Ansar Bank to serve IRGC members and Mehr
Bank to service Basij members, both of which are controlled by the
foundation81. The IRGC has also employed Liner Transport Kish
to support terrorist activities outside of Iran, such as providing
shipping services to Hizballah82. There are various companies that
are owned by the IRGC and not many have been designated as
affiliates of the IRGC. It is important to study and be aware of the
economic might that the IRGC is becoming.83

IRGC Technology Programs and
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Iraq is a client state of the IRGC’s services, and the
economic activity in Iran is a form of soft power that the IRGC
exploits to gain further control over the countries’ polity.
Telecommunication Company of Iran has made an agreement with
Iraq in 2011 to develop a communication network in the towns of
Karbaka and Najaf in Iraq.84 TCI representatives have stated that
the billion-dollar project that connects from Iran into Iraq will
allow Iraq to expand its communication networks throughout the
country.85 Both Iran and Iraq have also decided that they will work
together to create a joint stamp printing system that will be utilized
for both countries.86 Iraq has traditionally been an important
trading partner with Iran, and that is because the close proximity of
both states would typically made trade inevitable. In 2014, a free
trade agreement was signed between the Iranian and Iraqi regime,
however, there has been limitations in the trade deal being
implemented.

IRGC Building Iraqi Infrastructure
The IRGC has a control over petroleum products, however,
there are other companies that work in conjunction with the IRGC
to compliment the growth of one another. One is known as the
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, or IRISL, and this
company also has companies that are involved in the extraction
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and exportation of petroleum by products87. This pipeline is
expected to begin in Iran and follow through Turkey and Syria
until it reaches Europe.88 This pipeline is expected to be a $2.3
billion dollar agreement that will see up to 4 million cubic meters
of gas per day.89 While the free trade agreement has not be
officially implemented, an agreement being reached signifies a
desire for increase trade relations between the two countries. There
are soccer stadiums that are being built in Iraq, and that is the AlZawraa stadium and the Al-Tajiat stadium. These two stadiums are
under construction by Iranian companies, and while it has not been
disclosed as to which companies are building the stadiums, it
should be known that IRGC construction companies undertake a
majority of construction contracts. Iranian construction companies
have also helped build dams in the Shatt al-Arab waterway, but it
is argued that water has been redirected from the Kalal River and
the Karun and Karkah rivers in order to undermine Iraqi
agriculture90. This action has also resulted in the Basra province in
Iraq to experience a drought that has lasted since 200791

Trade
The volume of trade between Iraq and Iran in 2017 has been the
highest since 2003. It is reported that Iranian exports to Iraq
amount to 13 billion USD and that his figured is the result of
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Iranian exports doubling over 17 times over the past decade92.
However, the trade balance between Iran and Iraq is heavily
skewered because Iranian imports have relatively significant tax
cuts while Iraqi imports suffer from large tariffs93.Of the items that
Iran trades the most with Iraq, it is subsidized agricultural
products.94 The stark difference in trade taxes is because of
protectionist policies within the Iraqi polity that focuses on
favoring Iran. Iran is also aiding Iraq with their electrical needs
because Iraqi needs has outstripped the country’s ability to provide
for the demand. However, many Iraqi’s argue that Iran manipulates
the distribution of power in Iraq in an effort to control political
demands95.

Banks/Foundations
Iran operates five banks in Iraq and this development has allowed
Iraqi banks to open letters of credit with Iranian banks, which aid
in promoting trade96. These banks are located in Baghdad; Najaf;
and Karbala, areas that have communication lines running from
Iran. I addition, bonyads and construction firms, which are
controlled by the IRGC, are very active in the Shi’a South;
Baghdad; and Kurdistan Regional Government. The bonyads and
construction companies have helped build hospitals; clinics; and
other essential infrastructure to have support within Iraq. In
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addition, these institutions also lead housing construction in
Southern Iraq, which will represent 150 billion USD market value
nationwide97.

These aforementioned examples are case studies of how
IRGC companies have infiltrated the Iraqi economy. By growing
its economic influence within Iraq, the IRGC will have greater
funding to provide services to its forces both domestic and abroad.
In addition, the IRGC will have the opportunity to exploit its
economic influence within Iraq by deciding to shut down
operations or to limit productivity in an effort to cause policy
change in Iraq to favor the IRGC.
Regarding the IRGC, it has been noted that the organization
values its use of hard power. However, the IRGC is also adept at
influencing the political sphere of countries through the use of soft
powers.
Conclusion
2003 – The overthrow of Saddam Hussein
After the removal of Saddam Hussein from the Iraqi Polity, Iran
was in an advantageous position to improve its relationship with its
neighbor. This form of relationship improvement came in the form
of increasing border interaction; trade; the armament of military
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groups; and establishing strong political connection between Iraqi
and Iranian Politicians in order to destabilize the government98
2003-2009
Iranian backed political organizations return to Iraq and relations
between Iran and Iraq improve drastically. Iranian sympathizers
begin to mobilize in the populated Southern Iraq movement and
Iran supports many Shi’a politicians to win seats of representation
in parliament and general positions of power. The Quds force also
begins to arm Shi’a militants in order to help breed instability in
areas that are supported by the United States government.
2009- 2014
Shi’a led political groups gain more power. Daesh invades Iraq and
conquers northern Iraq and destabilizes the region. Iran begins to
mobilize militant groups in Iraq to repel Daesh. The PMU is
formed and it becomes the military organization that is most active
in repelling Daesh.
2014-Present
Deash is repelled and the PMU is established as a permanent
military organization in Iraq. Trade between Iran and Iraq reaches
an all-time high in 2017, by having traded 17 billion USD worth of
goods between the two nation-states. Iran receives contracts to aid
in the construction of the infrastructure of Iran, which results in
greater economic influence. Iranian supported politicians secure
xxxv

multiple seats in Parliament and it is expected that Iran will
support more Iranian sympathizers during the 2018 Parliament
election.
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Chapter IV: IRGC and Iranian Socio-economic Soft Power
Influence in Syria
The Importance of Syria to the IRGC and Iran
Since the aftermath of the Arab Spring within Syria. Iran has
praised the level of destabilization that has occurred in the Gulf
States and Northern Africa as “Islamic Awakenings” that were
inspired from its own revolution. But when that “Islamic
Awakening” reached Syria, the support of the Arab Spring quickly
shifted to one of opposition claiming that the Arab Spring in Syria
was a by-product of Western interference99. This shift in tone is
because the Iranian regime needs Syria to remain a functioning
authority in the Middle East to serve Iran’s interests. One of the
most vital functions that Syria plays is that it aids the IRGC in
supplying Iran’s most important ally, Hizbollah.100 Syria also is a
member of the Iranian fashioned “Axis of Resistance” that was
formed on the basis of resisting any form of influence that the
United States and Israel attempts to enforce101. Syria is also an
economic ally of Iran, as both countries have traded with one
another and Syria has become a nexus of supplies that imports
wares, e.g., weapons that are prohibited to be sold to Iran102.
Socially. The Assad regime’s religious affiliation to Alawites, an
offshoot of Shi’ism, has gravitated both countries together in
sectarian similarities and resistance to terrorist organizations that
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target Shi’a Muslims103. Syria has historically been one of the few
allies that Iran has within the Middle East, and because of the role
that it plays in supporting Hizbollah; its proximity to Israel; and its
poor relations with Saudi Arabia; the United States; and other prowestern forces, it is an ally that Iran cannot lose.
Military Power
Military Advisors
The Iranian regime has not directly sent military forces to aid in
the Syrian civil war, however, it has sent the IRGC and Quds force
to act as military advisors to coordinate militia groups and to train
the supporters of the Assad regime.104 In giving financial;
technical; and educational support to the Shi’a militias and Assad
regime105. Of the first set of training that the IRGC offered the
Assad regime were techniques on how to suppress uprisings;
unpopular protests; and social media/internet interruption.106 The
IRGC’s training and advice from the experiences that the
organization had in suppressing the Green Movement and the 1999
student protest.107
Syrian War Negotiations
Throughout the peace talk negotiations within the Syrian Civil
War, Iran has played an important role in the peace talk process.
The influence that Iran has with the actual peace talk process is
that they are prolonging the Syrian Civil War until main the
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factions of the war, the Syrian Government and the rebel forces,
come to an agreement that mainly appeases Iran.108 Iranian
officials have claimed that the Iranian regime believes in a political
solution, but that it must be a part of that political solution, which
means that Iran will only negotiate with actors that it is willing to
make peace with.109 It is evident that Iran is prolonging the war in
Syria, and it is to Iran’s best interests in attempting to secure its
position as regional hegemon to ensure that the war continues until
western forces no longer support the rebels. The Syrian War has
transformed from a civil conflict into a proxy war that has Iran as
the main force in determining the duration of the war in Syria.
Iranian Influence with Russia
Russia has had a checkered pat with Syria, however, Syria is the
closest ally to Russia in the Levant. Syria permits Russia to have
naval bases within the country and to aid the Assad regime with its
civil conflict, which helps create a position of international
influence within the Middle East for Russia through Syria110111.
Russia’s primary concern with the fall of the Assad regime is that
it will greatly weaken Iran because Syria is an essential ally in
connecting Iran with Hizbollah, but Iran also has numerous
economic; political; and social interests within Iran112. While the
war in Syria has caused many to question why Russia is defending
the Assad regime, it should be considered that Iranian relationship
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with Russia in coordinating in the Syrian front is increasing
relationships between both parties and their influence within the
area. While both Iran and Russia have not traditionally worked
together: The Shah had staunch anti-Soviet ideals those feelings
did not improve after the fall of the Shah113. It is speculated that
Iran’s interests in becoming a nuclear power and investing in
Russian resources to improve Iranian capabilities began dialogue
for both countries to cooperate.114 Furthermore, both countries
have similar political orientation in anti-western sentiments; both
dear the resurgence of the Taliban; and greater Sunni influence.115
Russian and Iranian influence have even increased to the point that
Tehran joined the Customs Union, a Moscow-led free trade
organization116. Iran and Russia have not operated as closely
together than the Syrian war, and the outcome of the Syrian war
will create an even greater alliance between Iran; Russia; and
Syria, which will give Iran an even greater ally within the UN. The
relationship between Iran and Russia being the made cause for
Putin’s intervention in Syria is furthered because while Syria
receives shipment of weaponry, it is Iran that pays for the delivery
of the arms. When Russia is not able to directly deliver the
firearms to Syria, Russia will send the weaponry to Iran so that the
IRGC or Quds force may deliver the weapons on the behalf of
Russia.117 Russia’s support for the Assad regime both in the UN
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and the frontlines has assured the survival of the Assad regime,
however, if Iran were not involved in the situation, then it is not
likely that Russia would have supported the Assad regime.
Ideological Influence
Sectarian Dominance
Syria is a diverse country with a variety of ethnicities and religions
that compromise the social paradigm. The Alawite community, an
offshoot of Shi’a Islam, currently wields the most authority within
Syria, even though it compromises only 13 percent of the
population. Since the ascent of Hafez Al-Assad’s rise to power in
claiming the presidency.118 Positions of governmental authority
have traditionally been assigned to loyal Alawite followers and this
trend still persists with the current Syrian President, Bashar AlAssad119. The Al-Assad regime has been notorious for attacking its
Sunni communities, as seen by the Hasam Massacre that saw
20,000-40,000 Sunnis being killed to stop the spread of revolt
against the Assad regime120. Since the Daesh occupation of Syrian
territories and the Arab Spring, Iran has contributed to training and
maintaining Assad’s dominance within Syria. This also is done
through the utilization of Shi’a militias within Syria and the
empowerment of Shi’a community at large.
Iran has spearheaded the creation of multiple Shi’a militias to aid
the Assad regime, the most prominent being the Shabiha militia, or
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the National Defense Force, which will be referred to as the
NDF.121 The NDF has been compared to the Iranian Basij for
practicing aggressive tactics to secure authority in the Syrian
domestic front, e.g., extortion; blackmail; kidnappings; and
extrajudicial killings.122 The Quds commander, Qasem Soleimani,
has been attributed with the creation of the NDF. During the
beginning of the Syrian Civil War, 7,000 Iranian and Iraqi fighters
have been deployed through the guidance of the Quds and general
IRGC force to assist that Assad regime.123 Alongside the NDF, the
IRGC has also coordinated with its allied groups to send 5,000
Hizbollah fighters; 5,000 Iraqi Shi’a fighters; and 18,000 Afghan
and Pakistani fighters to aid the Assad Regime124. The exact figure
as to the extent of how many Shi’a fighters is still unknown
because it is estimated that thousands of Shi’a militiamen have
come to Syria to help defend Shi’a shrines and interests125. The
large inflow of Shi’a fighters and their dominance over security
within Syria has caused sectarian tension, as Sunni and Christian
Syrians are weary of the power influx in the military influence that
the Shi’a have in Syria. A top advisor to Ayatollah Khamenei has
also stated that Iran must and will have an enduring military
presence within Syria and Iraq in an effort to defend “Islamic
Unity.”126 Khamenei’s advisor stated that Iran’s liaison furthered
the justification for military occupation of Iraq and Syria by stating
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that it must do so to combat potential Israeli and American
incursion and to suppress any Kurdish attempt to challenge the
governments of Iraq and Syria.127
Iranian Education
As basic infrastructure begins to re-open, Iran has focused on
expanding its influence in the education field. One major Iranian
institution that has recently been granted approval to open a
satellite institution in Syria is the Islamic Azad University. Iranian
officials have reached out to Al-Assad stating that Iran is prepared
at any moment to construct Islamic Azad University branches in all
the major cities of Syria128. Iranian officials have stated in
establishing Iranian funded universities, it is to be expected that
Shiite and Islamic culture will be focused on; the Persian language
will be an essential language; and Iranian ideals will be
promoted129. In addition, educational; charitable; and cultural
organizations to indoctrinate young Shiites for Iran’s regional
power struggle.130 Iranian officials emphasized the institutions like
the Islamic Azad University is essential for training the next
generation of resistance, a term used to describe Iranian areas of
influence. It was also stated that the Basij organization should play
a direct role in directing the social; cultural; and political direction
of the Iranian backed educational communities within Syria. 131
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Economic Soft Power
Reconstructing Syria
In the aftermath of the occupation of Syrian cities, the task of
reconstructing the Syrian infrastructure became a source of income
and an avenue of power aggregation for Iran and the IRGC. In
January 8th, 2018, The Syrian Prime Minister Imad Khamis gave
all Iranian companies priorities in bidding for contracts that
focused on the reconstruction of Syrian cities132. In addition, the
meeting assured Iranian delegates that the Syrian government will
add incentives to persuade Iranian companies to take part in the
Syrian reconstruction and to have a direct role in the Syrian
market133. The Commander of the IRGC, Major General
Mohammad Ali Jafari, also stated It has been disclosed that the
IRGC will lead the reconstruction effort within Syria instead of
private companies in order to assure that Syria will also remain
secured134.
The IRGC has also secured multiple contracts that focuses on
rebuilding the electrical grids for Syria and has begun to work
alongside Venezuelan counterparts to constructed oil refineries
within Syria by the end of the year.135 A majority of these contracts
have been estimated to be worth several million Euros and focused
mainly on the reconstruction of electricity equipment; power
plants; and telecommunication lines.136 One of the contract
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agreements was to create five gas-powered power plants to
Northwestern Aleppo, and the Mapna Group, a suspected IRGC
owned company, is leading this 130 million euro effort137. Iran has
also secured a contract to restore Damascus’ main electricity
power plant in Deir Ezzor and Homs138. While Deir Ezzor is still a
warzone that is occupied by Daesh, Syrian and Iranian forces
expect its liberation and have begun to discuss reconstruction
efforts. Syria has also announced that it will import 540 megawatts
of electricity from Iran to the Latakia Province.139 The IRGC has
also been granted a contract to build a mobile phone network
system and this project is to be taken by the Mobile
Telecommunication Network of Iran.140 The IRGC has secured
lucrative contracts from Iran as a form of reward for the Iranian
regime preserving the Assad regime. In response to Iran’s
assistance, the Assad regime will focus on further strengthening
economic relations with Iran, which will predominantly favor the
IRGC for its role in protecting the Assad regime. 141
Trade
As the Syrian regime makes further progress in securing its most
populated areas, Iranian exports within Syria are increasing. In
2010, the volume of annual trade between Syria and Iran reached
$545 million dollars, with 30 percent accounting for Syrian exports
into Iran142. However, it has been reported that trade between Iran
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and Syria has amounted to about one billion dollars in 2018143.
However, while the volume of trade has increased between both
countries, Iranian exports account for about 95 percent of the
trade.144 In an effort to increase bi-lateral trade relations between
Iran and Syria, two shipping lines are expected to be built
connecting both countries. Iran’s trade attaché in Damascus, Ali
Kazmeni, stated that while Syrian markets are filled with
merchandize from the Arab world, the Syrian government is keen
in making Iranian goods the main imports.145 Iranian officials have
also discussed about the potential of having a free trade agreement
between both countries.146 Iranian officials have also attempted to
encourage Iranian businessmen to purchase property in the Shiite
majority neighborhoods of Damascus147.
Banking
Between the discussions with Iranian and Syrian delegates, there
are aspirations to begin to improve banking relations. While there
are not official banks that have been established in Syria with
connections to Iran or IRGC companies, both countries have
decided that the inclusion of banks will bolster trade relations148.
The discussion opening banks within Syria of Iranian designation
can be troubling for Syria because Syria already has borrowed
billions of dollars from Iran in the past years. If Syria continues to
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focus on Iranian credit lines then Syria will eventually be at the
economic mercy of Iran.
Conclusion
1979 – 2000
President Hafez Assad has been in powered after a successful
military coup for 8 years, Syria’s alliances with Egypt and Iraq
have fallen through but Syria found an ally with Iran after the
successful Islamic Revolution of 1979.149 Khomeini reciprocated
the postitive feelings and looked at Syria as a useful ally to
empower the Shi’a dominated Southern Lebanon.150 Syria
supported Iran throughout the Iran-Iraq war by stopping an antiIranian collation from being formed within the Arab League; shut
down oil pipelines that connected from Iraq into Syria; and began
to limit trade between both countries.151 Furthermore, Iran would
offer aid to Syria by providing one million free barrels of oil and
eight million barrels at 2.50 USD below market value per barrel.
Iran also did not condemn the Assad regime for Hama massacre of
1982 in an effort to prioritize a strong relationship.152 During the
Iran-Iraq war, when Iran suffered embargos from western forces in
being prevented from buying firearms, Syria became a transit
country to deliver weapons to Iran. Syria also played an important
role in the creation of Hizbollah because the Assad regime gave
passageway for 500 IRGC soldiers to enter southern Lebanon and
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to train and give guidance to the Shi’a in order to create
Hizbollah.153
2000-Present
After the death of Hafez Assad, Bashar Assad rose to power and
the relationship between Iran and Syria changed into a strategic
cooperation. After Syrian forces were removed from Lebanon and
relations between Syria and other Arab countries suffered due to
Assad’s support for the Iranian regime, so Iran became one of few
allies that Syria had.154 During the U.S. occupation of Iraq, Iran
would fund and support Shi’a militias in attacking U.S. forces.
Syria would allow terrorist forces to use Syria as a transit country
to passage into Iraq for training.155 After Assad was compelled to
withdraw 18,000 troops from Lebanon, the Assad regime felt
“loosing Lebanon” was a humiliating blow, and this incited an
even stronger relationship between Syria; Iran; and Hizbollah. This
eventually culminated into the “Axis of Resistance” a defensive
agreement that would see all three parties support each other in the
case of Israeli and western incursion. 156 After the Arab Spring,
Iran ensured that the Assad regime did not fall and it was because
of Iran’s support that the Assad regime survived the civil war.
While Syria has not reclaimed all of its territory, the war has
became one of attrition with Syria receiving full support from Iran
and Russia. While Syria has survived a potential revolution, it is
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Iran that has succeed the most, because it has not just gained a
stronger relationship within Syria, but a foothold in its economy;
politics; and society.
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Chapter V: IRGC and Iranian Socio-Political Soft Power
Influence in Yemen
The Importance of Yemen to the IRGC and Iran
Geographically, Yemen is adjacent to Saudi Arabia. Yemen’s
ethnic Houthis group, which has beliefs that align with the Shi’a
sect, has also overtaken the monarchy of Yemen and has replaced
it with an ethnically dominated quasi-democracy. Yemen also has
negative views on Saudi Arabia because of a military campaign
that the KSA (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) has launched on the
Houthis rebels. Because of Yemen’s geographical location;
varying ethnic groups that align to Shi’a ideology; and antimonarch sentiments make it the optimal ally for Iran. Iran can and
is using Yemen as a source of recruitment for Iran’s proxy wars
and a staging ground to conduct operations against the KSA. In
addition, the IRGC is exploiting the Yemeni war to improve its
political influence within the country; increase economic trade; and
establish Iran and the IRGC as a social icon. Iran, through its
socio-economic activities, is attempting to establish a strategic
foothold. By having greater presence in Yemen, Iran will be able
to control the traffic in the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Bab
Mandal, which links the Arabian Gulf to the Indian Ocean in the
Red Sea to the Suez Canal, the main waterway for the World’s
Oil157.
l

Military power
Military Advisory
Mohammad Ali Jafari, the head of the IRGC has admitted that
Tehran is assisting the Houthi rebels, a move that they had
previously gone on record on denying158. Jafari has stated that the
IRGC is keen on assisting the resistance front, whenever one may
be found, and that the people ad government of Yemen have
sought the assistance of Iran in the wake of Saudi aggression.159
The IRGC commander has stated that it will not hesitate to offer
assistance to the Houthi forces in the future either. IRGC
commanders have stated that they would also like to increase their
presence directly in Yemen by embarking in “military advisory
missions.160” The purpose of these “military advisory missions” is
to increase their military presence in an attempt to influence the
countries social; political; and economic decisions. Similar to what
has occurred in Iraq and Syria, the IRGC plans to replicate
conditions in Yemen161.
Weaponry
Asides from sending military advisors, the IRGC has sent military
hardware in the forms of weaponry to Yemen. Saudi; Americans;
and their allies have reported in confiscating weapon shipments
from Iran to Yemen.
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Figure 2162
Riyadh has reported that they have been aware of Iranian led
support to the Houthi rebels since 2015 and earlier163. The Conflict
Armament Research, or CAR, center obtained photos and
information regarding the transfer of weapons in the Arabian
Peninsula. Between February and March of 2016, coalition
warships have intercepted vessels that originate from the Iranian
shipbuilder, Al Mansoor, and have discovered newly manufactured
weapons. It is speculated the seized weapons were destined for
Somalia and Yemen and originated from Iran. 164 Furthermore, the
weapons that were seized has similar matching parts of origin from
weapons that are in circulation in the Yemeni black-market.
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Figure 3165
Asides from an increase flow in weaponry, Houthi forces have also
ascertained sophisticated weaponry, e.g., Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle, or UAV, technology. On February 26, 2017, Houthi
forces have displayed four UAVs and there has been research
gathered that these UAVs have been outfitted with explosives to
detonate when reaching their targets, e.g., Saudi led coalition
forces166. Upon investigation of the Houthi used drones, the Qasef1, it is determined that it is an offshoot of the Ababil-II, a done
manufactured by the IRGC company, Iran’s Aircraft
Manufacturing Industrial Company, or HESA167. The drones that
have been utilized by Houthi forces have been intercepted via a
known smuggling route in Oman, which denotes that the drones
are manufactured by Iran and sent to the Houthi forces for
usage168. The purpose of the UAVs are to enter enemy air space
and to target MIM-104 Patriot surface to air missile systems. The
UAVs are outfitted with explosives in order to crash into the
surface to air missile systems, disabling them169. Outside of aerial
drone technology, Houthi forces are utilizing unmanned water
crafts outfitted with explosives to target Saudi coalition naval
forces. These unmanned boats are known as Water-Borne
Improvised Explosive Devices, or WBIED(s)170. Unlike other
weaponry that has been use by the Houthi forces, devices such as
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the WBIED have not been linked to Iran, however, parts that are
utilized in constructing these barges have been linked to Iranian
manufactures. Simia Cable Co. an Iranian cable company,
specifically, the cable that are used to transmit commands from the
WBIED’s computer guidance system and the rest of the ship’s
infrastructure171.

Figure 4172
Houthi forces have used IEDs against Saudi coalition forces,
however, the level of technology in current IEDs have become
more sophisticated. New devices created to resemble natural rocks
have been discovered and are armed through radio control.173
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Figure 5174
Between April 2017 and February 2018, Conflict Armed Research,
or CAR, have conducted missions in Yemen in which they retrieve
sophisticated IEDs and have linked their components to Iranian
origins. Of the components that have been retrieved from the
aforementioned mission, they have similar builds from the
captured Jihan 1 cargo vessel that was intercepted in 2013 en route
from Iran175.
Pre and Post Arab Spring
Iran has had a role in the Yemeni polity throughout history, but its
role has increased drastically from 2004 – 2010 during the Houthi
conflict with the government176. It was in 2011, when Yemeni
politics became even more chaotic than it was due to the political
transition that was being attempted due to the Arab Spring that
prompted Iran to become greatly involved in the Yemeni Polity.
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Iran strengthened its alliance with the Houthi rebels through
ideological; political; financial; and military support.
Ideological Influence
Education
Prior to Iranian intervention within Yemen, Iran has endeavored to
affect Yemeni politics by encouraging specific ethnic groups to
study within Iran to undergo political manipulation.177 The Zaidi
community within Yemen was one of the communities that was
targeted by Iran. Iran has succeeded in attracting many Zaidi men,
many of whom are prominent members of the Houthi movement,
such as Abdul-Malik, the current leader of the Houthis178. The
Houthi movement has multiple qualities that are borrowed from
the rhetoric of the Iranian Revolution mentality. In the speech
given by Abdul-Malik, he references in admiration Khomeini and
Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah as the leading examples in the
resistance to both Colonialism and Zionism. Abdul-Malik also
borrows some slogans from the Iranian Revolution, such as “Death
to America” and “Death to Israel179.”
The Iranian regime has also offered scholarships to many Yemeni
students who belongs to the Houthis to study in Qom. Zaidi
students who belong to tribes of Sheiks or high school graduates
were also granted scholarships, of which were all supplied by the
Iranian embassies180. Those that would receive these scholarships
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would be given admission to institutions that specialize in the
education of the principles of the Iranian Revolution and the
theology of the Twelvers181. There would be large inflows of
Yemeni students that would decide to study in Iranian institutions,
and while they were not recipients of scholarships, their living and
costs and tuitions were covered by Iranian government. The
students that would study in Iran were essentially transformed to
focus on bringing a positive Iranian perspective to the Houthi
movement and Yemeni political system. Many of the students that
would study in Iran were also prompted to convert to the Twelver
Shi’a sect and to become advocates of the Twelver sect once the
students would return to Yemen. Most of the students that would
come to study in Iran would be received by leaders of the IRGC.
The students would be distributed to three IRGC camps in Shiraz;
Mashhad; and Isfahan182
Religion
Southern Yemen, long thought to be the stronghold of the Zaidis,
has also had the support from Iran in reviving its religious
institutions, which have found large scale support from Iran.
Iranian Mariji, who are predominantly followers of the Shia’
clerics: Ali Sistani and Jawad Shaherstani in Qom, have provided
religious educational programs and multimedia for the Zaidiss183.
The religious material that is given to the Zaidis are certified by the
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University of Religions and Denominations, which is specialized
to train Twelvers Shi’a or non-Twelver Shi’a184. The intent of the
Iranian regime was to transform those that study in Iran to return to
Yemen and to become advocates of Iranian ideology.
To further Iran’s own influence within Yemen, the Iranian
embassy has exported many celebrations and conversion tactics
within Yemen to influence the Zaidi sect that Iran has the most
influence over. For example, Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei,
ordered the renovation of the Srine of Nasser Haqq, who was a
Zaidi Imam of the 3rd century, to strengthen the relationship
between Iran and the Zaidi community185. Iran
Media
Iran has attracted prominent Yemeni media professionals to assist
in promoting a positive Iranian image across various Yemeni
governorates and have even succeeded in recruiting many
aforementioned media professionals in working for the Iranian
media industry186. The Iranian regime has trained over 1300
Yemeni media professionals who have been sent to Lebanon; Iraq;
and Iran to specialize in technologies and software for satellite
broadcasting. They have also been trained to become directors;
news anchors; writers; and hosts for radio stations187. Iran has also
funded the launch of several satellite channels that focus on the
promotion of the Iranian and Houthi ideologies188. Examples of
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these programs are the Mayadeen Maserah channels that have their
content created in Beirut by Houthis and the Aden Live Channel
that belongs to the Southern Movement of Yemen189. Iran is also
using its religious connection with the Zaidi community as a
gateway to begin to influence the politics of the country by
embedding religious politics within different political blocs. To be
more exact, Political Shiism has been taught and preached within
Shi’a dominant areas to convert those that do not ascribe to the
Twelver Shiite doctrine190. While not every Zaidi member follows
the Twelver sect, the Zaidi community is aware of Iranian
conversion efforts and permits Iranian activities to continue, which
will give Iran a social foothold within Iran191.
Economic Soft Power
Bilateral Economic Agreements
After the Houthi rebels and their allies deposed the then president
of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, Iran signed joint economic
agreements with the Houthi rebels in the oil; electricity; aviation;
and sea transit field192. These agreements also involved a pledge
from the Iranian petroleum sector to provide petrol products of a
year and to establish electricity plants in the provinces of Ade,
Hodeida, and Taiz. In addition, Iran will also repair electricity
transmission lines between Marib and Sana193. The Iranian regime
has also vowed to expand the port of Hodeida, set a line of credit
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to supply Yemen with whatever products they need, dispatch
Iranian experts to help repair all Yemeni infrastructures, and create
a sky bridge to improve trade between the two countries194. These
agreements were a blatant declaration that Iran is more than just a
supporter of the Houthi rebels, they are a bonafide ally. The
policies were never implemented, however, because on March 26,
2015, Decisive Storm, a Saudi-led Arab coalition against the
Houthi rebels stopped the agreements from ever being put into
place.195
Further Research regarding economic soft power must be
observed
Due to the current volatile situation that is happening in Yemen,
and the likelihood that conflict will continue, the IRGC and other
Iranian entities cannot commence in economic soft powers. This is
because with a lack of structure in Yemen, the possibility for
economic gain with the IRGC will result in a minimal return. The
Saudi-led coalition is also a deterrent to Iranian economic
influence because any programs that can aid in stimulating
agricultural; construction; and school programs are possible
targets. Until the Yemeni conflict has a political transition and a
stable social order is established, the IRGC will not be able to
entrench their influence with economic soft power.
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Conclusion
Post Iranian Revolution
Historically, Yemen has always been an essential city in the
Iranian polity, since the Hemieri dynasty, in which the Persian
Empire vied over control of the region that is now known as
Yemen from the Roman Empire196. During the 20th century, Iran
and Yemen had limited interaction until the conclusion of the
Yemeni revolution against Zaidi rule, which only saw that Shah
give marginal support to the Royal forces197. During the Shah’s
dominion, Iran had little interaction with the Shi’a dominated south
because Southern Yemen was affiliated with the Communist
Eastern Bloc while Iran were allies with the United States.
However, after the revolution of 1979, that all began to change.
Post 1979 revolution
After the Iranian Revolution, Iranian involvement within Yemen
began to increase by the invitation of Zaidi students to receive
greater education at the University within Iran; Syria; and
Lebanon198. Iran’s intention was to attract Shi’a elites into studying
at institution that support the political revolution ideology that led
to the transition of government in Iran in an effort to export the
Iranian Revolution199. While Iran began to have a better
relationship with Southern Yemen, Northern Yemen had little
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connection to the new Islamic Republic because of the close
relationship between Saddam’s regime and Northern Yemen.
1990: Yemeni Unification
After the unification of northern and southern Yemen, Iran began
to increase its socio-political influence within Yemen. This is
because GCC countries had severed its ties with Yemen after their
support for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Iran began an religious
initiative to promote the Shi’a Twelver sect and to increase
interaction with the Zaidi Shi’a community200. Examples of these
activities were inviting prominent Zaidi community members to
conferences; Iranian celebrations; and a greater exportation of
Iranian politics to the Zaidi community.
Arab Spring
From 2004-2010, the Iranian regime supported the Houthi rebels
with their conflict against the Yemeni government. But Iranian
involvement with both the Houthi rebels an Yemen proliferated
during and after the Arab Spring. Because of the political; social;
economic; and religious uncertainties that has resulted in the
difficult political transitions since the overthrow of the Saleh
regime, Yemen is in a chaotic state. The Iranian regime is
supporting the Houthi rebels in order to strengthen their alliance
and to influence the group through socio-political means. Prior to
the emergence of the Houthi rebels, Iran has supported the south of
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Yemen, as relationships between Tehran and the former Southern
Yemeni politician, Ali Salem Beid, were warm. However, tensions
arose between the former and latter because of Iranian support for
the Houthi rebels, who have attempted to take control of the South
of Yemen201.
2015 to Present
Iran and the Houthi forces have attempted to initiate economic;
social; and political agreements, all of which see Iran taking
contracts and exploiting Yemen for the resources and using their
people and territory as satellite regions for the interests. However,
because of the ongoing war between Houthi rebels and the Saudi
led coalition, Iran is not able to take a proactive role because the
risk of involvement in a potential conflict with Saudi Arabia will
cause strain on Iran and their attempt to agglomerate power within
the region.

lxiii

lxiv

Chapter VI: Conclusion
Overview
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Crops, or the IRGC, has been an
apparatus of the Iranian regime that has created a large scale of
destruction and destabilization throughout the Middle East. By
utilizing its military prowess; ideological manipulation; and
economic soft power, the IRGC has achieved in promoting their
interests in Iraq; Syria; and Yemen.
Research Question Response
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Cords has not made it discreet
that it is attempting to export its revolution, as the concept of the
Iranian ideology exportation is an integral portion of the Iranian
Constitution. However, instead of using force or subversion to
spread its belief, the IRGC has used soft power to accrue influence
internationally. But when referencing that case studies of Iraq;
Syria; and Yemen, it is not a political Islam agenda that Iran has
been supporting, but instead a pro-Iranian stance. In each of the
case studies, the IRGC has used military power; ideology; and
economic soft power to improve its own positioning in the country
case studies and to allow a positive Iranian stance to grow. In
conclusion, Iran is not infiltrating other countries to export its
revolution, but instead it is infiltrating other countries to establish a
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foothold and to accrue power to eventually become a regional
hegemony.
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Ideology
Iraq
The Iranian regime has utilized Ideology is a driving force to
improve the interaction between Iran and Iraq at a social and
political level. However, there is speculation amongst the religious
leaders of Iraq that Iran is attempting to establish velayat-e faghih,
a concept that would concede religious leadership to Iran. The
Grand Ayatollah of Iraq, Ali Sistani, is one such leader that is
hesitant of allowing Iranian religious influence to expand, and
because of Sistani’s popularity amongst Shi’a followers, The
Iranian regime cannot dispose of him. Therefore, Iran has funded
the creation of universities that focuses on the installment of
Iranian ideology and philosophy into the youth of Iraq. The IRGC
has also constructed improve tourist facilities for pilgrims within
Iraq. Iran has also donated to the construction of Islamic centers;
schools; and medical facilities within Shi’a neighborhoods in order
to improve relations between the regime and the people. Iran has
also begun to groom potential spiritual successors to Sistani that
have warmer opinions towards the regime, as Sistani’s age will see
him pass on. Asides from religion and education, the Iranian
regime has also established media projects to broadcast a positive
image of the Iranian regime as the ‘protectors’ of Iraq. While
religion and education are both important tools of mobilization,
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they are only pertinent to the religious and youth. Media is a tool
that will be dispersed to everyone. While Iran does not have
absolute ideological dominance within Iraq, it has taken the
appropriate measures to improve its image and influence. Through
religion; education; and media, Iran will be able to create a cult of
personality that see’s Iran as an ally and this warmer interpretation
will be able to bridge better relationships between both countries.
Syria
Unlike Iraq, Syria is a state is ruled by an Alawite minority, an off
short of the Shi’a sect, with a Sunni majority. Regardless, the
IRGC Quds force has altered the composition of the entire country
by bringing in Shi’a militia fighters. These fighters are tasked with
the preservation of holy sites to the Shi’a faith. The importance of
these fighters is that while they are in Syria, they create a new
power dynamic that see’s neighborhoods and entire cities under the
control of Shi’a adherents, creating a sectarian power inflow from
Sunni members of the community to the Shi’a militia fighters. Iran
has also created education programs in Syria in the form of
constructing schools and universities. In addition, Iran is
constructing Shi’a religious culture centers that promote the
Persian language and Iranian ideals, such as being anti-American
and Israeli. Iran has also created a cultural Basij organization that
focuses creating a positive Iranian image within poorer parts of
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Syria. The Basij organization also is used to suppress protests, and
with training from the IRGC Quds force, the Basij organization
could be an important role in maintaining Assad in power and
ensuring that protests do not progress as they did during the offset
of the Arab Spring. Just like in Iraq, the ideological influence that
Iran has within Syria will ensure a positive image within the
people. In addition, by promoting religious; ideological and
political concepts that are pushed by Iran onto the Syrian
population, Iran can use these similarities to improve their
influence within Syria as a whole.
Yemen
The level of influence that Iran has within Yemen is not
comparable to that that it has in Syria and Iraq. However, that is
not to say that there is not a level of interaction within between
Iranian ideology and Yemen. Prior to the onset of the current
Yemeni civil war, Iran has sponsored members of the Zaidi
community, a shi’a based ethnic group, to come study within Iran.
These community members would receive boarding and
scholarships on the behalf of the Iranian government with the goal
of radicalizing the members into forming a zeal of loyalty to
Iranian ideologies. When these members would return to their
community of origin, they would also espouse the teachings that
they receive from Iran to their community at large. Even when the
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Houthi rebels gained powers, the Houthi would use terminology
that is traditional to the Iranian Revolution mentality. Currently,
Iran is still offering scholarships to Houthi youths in an attempt to
continue the creation of the ‘resistance’ mentality into the new
generation. The Zaidi community has also had a large inflow of
donations in the form of twelve sect propaganda so that they may
be converted. These efforts have been supported by Iran and Iraqi
clerics. The Iranian regime has also begun projects to reconstruct
damaged Shi’a shrines within territory that has been traditionally
occupied by the Zaidi community, as well. Iran has also trained
and educated Houthi members to run media outlets that promote a
positive Iranian identity in an attempt to greater improve the
perception of Iran throughout Yemen. The goals of Iran within
Yemen is to ensure that society has a positive outlook on Iran
because the greater the reception to Iranian influence, the greater
the power that Iran will have over Yemeni society.
Military Power
Iraq
The destabilization or the increased destabilization of a region and
nation state is a tatic that the IRGC utilizes to create an
environment in which the IRGC or the Iranian regime may exploit
to serve their purposes. For example, the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard Corps has permeated into the military apparatus of multiple
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foreign forces. The aforementioned infiltration takes the form of
supplying militaries with financial aid or equipment, which creates
dependency on the Iranian regime. The IRGC also imports foreign
fighters to partake in the conflicts of other countries in order to
establish a dependency to Iran to continue to supply fighters. The
overall objective of the IRGC is to establish dependency to both
the IRGC and Iran by creating or supporting a destabilized region
to supply weaponry and troops or to create a war economy.
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the IRGC trained and supplied
Shi’a militias within Iraq to combat the United States and their
coalition. While the assistance that the IRGC gave to these militias
was not substantial, the majority was exposed to Iranian support
and this would contribute to the creation of warmed opinions
towards Iran and its regime. Post Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq’s
military was disorganized and relied on rag tag militias. So when
Daesh rose to influence and began to attack and conquer different
Iraqi cities, the Iraqi military was not prepared and ultimately
succumbed to the violence of Daesh. In response to the increasing
violence within Iraq, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani responded with a
fatwa and created the Shi’a majority Popular Mobilization Unit.
The PMU was further supported by the IRGC in terms of advanced
training; funding; and weapon shipments. Eventually, the PMU
became the largest military apparatus in the entirety of Iraq and
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would eventually be integrated as a permanent wing of the Iraqi
military. The PMU is now the largest and most organized branch
of the Iraqi military, and due to its connection to Iran and its Shi’a
majority membership, it has the possibility to take control of the
Iraqi polity. What is the most beneficial for Iran is that the Iraqi
Shi’a majority have accepted and approved a majority of the
actions of the PMU, whether they are military actions or political
inclusion. If the PMU is able to hold the most power within Iraq by
using sectarianism as a basis for their right to mobilize Iraq, then a
sudden change in power will occur. The traditional establishment
of the Sunni power conflux will be replaced by a Shi’a regime that
has connections to Iran. In the past, Iran has supported political
organizations that have promoted a positive relationship with Iran.
But with the sudden ascension of the PMU to power, the IRGC
will train former PMU commanders to run for positions of political
power. The PMU already has a positive perception among the Iraqi
population, so succeeding politically against the current regime
that has been interpreted to have failed the Iraqi people is
plausible. IF the PMU is to secure a high level of positions, then
the PMU will transcend being a military organizations and will be
political, as well, similar to Hezbollah.
Syria
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Syria has experienced severe instability as a result of the Syrian
Civil War that begun in 2011. The current leader of Syria, Bashar
al-Assad, is an Alewitee minority is an offshoot of the Shia’a sect,
and is an ally of the Iranian regime. The IRGC sent its Quds force,
a special force that is designated to train and supply foreign
fighters to the Syrian front to act as military advisors. The Quds
force has offered the Assad regime a better understanding on how
to manipulate social media; how to suppress protests; create IEDs;
and other techniques that the IRGC learned during the suppression
of the 1999 Green Movement. With this new training, it will be
assured that the Assad regime will act with greater prejudice when
faced with a protest in order to stop similar demonstrations that led
to the 2011 civil war. The close cooperation between the Quds
force and the Syrian military also creates a closer relationship
between Syria and Iran that will increase their allegiance to one
another. Iran has also been included throughout the peace talks that
are focused on ending the civil war. By being a part of
negotiations, Iran could influence the Assad regime to accept or
refuse negotiations based on the fact if they see the results
beneficial. Further influence that Iran has is seen through their
relationship with Russia. While the Assad regime and Russia have
traditionally been allies, it is the relationship between Assad and
Russia that should be examined because Iran and Russia have not
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cooperated as closely as they do during the Syrian Civil War. Iran
uses revenue from their oil sales to buy Russian weapons to
transport to Syria, and when Russia is not able to send the weapons
to Syria, they transport the arms to Iran so that the Quds force may
deliver them. Iran has also bought materials to greater their
capabilities of nuclear material cultivation to greater their nuclear
program. The close relationship that was cultivated between Russia
and Iran will continue past the Syrian Civil War, and with
increased western antagonism towards Iran and Russia, they will
only improve relationships with one another. With Russia being a
great power in the UN, as well, Iran will have gained an ally that
can veto any resolution that the US attempts to pass.
Yemen
The Yemeni Civil War has been ongoing since 2015 when the
Houthi rebels overtook the capital of Yemen, Sana’a. The Houthi,
an ethnic group that is predominantly Shi’a, has received support
from Iran and the IRGC in the form of both advising and
weaponry. The Quds force have trained the Houthi rebels in IED
construction and they have supplied the rebels with a plethora of
small arms and drones. One of the drones that have been used are
automated boats that are outfitted with explosives that are utilized
to attack coalition forces and freighter shipments. The Quds force
have also supplied rockets to the rebels to launch at the Saudi
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Arabian front. Yemen is an important ally to Iran because not only
is Iran gaining favor with the rebel forces, but by increasing their
presence they are begin given direct access to the border of Saudi
Arabia. Iran has gone on record in stating that Saudi Arabia is the
number one enemy of the regime, and by utilizing the Houthi
rebels as a proxy force, Iran has begun to attack Saudi Arabia in
the form of UAVs; rocket launches; and frater shipment attacks.
Economy
Iraq
Iran and Iraq are both essential trade partners, with Iran exporting
various commodities to Iraq. But trade between both are not equal,
as Iran holds more economic influence over Iraq than in vice versa.
And Iranian economic influence has steadily increased since the
deposition of Saddam Hussein, as Iranian foundations; bonyads;
and other economic apparatuses have expanded their influence
within the Iraqi borders. These aforementioned government
controlled economic establishments, many of which are ran by the
IRGC, employ unfair economic practices that results in the surplus
economic extraction from their Iraqi patrons. By being tax exempt
and receiving preferential trade agreements, Iran grows in wealth
as they continue to trade with Iraq. Iran also established
technological infrastructure within Iraq, such as creating
communication networks, of which are controlled by Iran within

lxxvi

Iraq. Iran has also received construction contracts to improve the
Iraqi infrastructure, mainly in Shi’a dominated areas, by building
stadiums; neighborhoods; and other vital construction projects.
Iran has also opened more banks within Iraq and has created credit
lines, of which can have high interest rates, so that Iraq may
borrow money in an effort to improve their infrastructure. While
all these aforementioned economic practices seem like a normal
part of foreign relations, they are a means to control power through
economic practices. All the establishments that were mentioned are
Iranian controlled, which means that if Iraq were to abide by any
agreements that Iran does not agree to, Iran will have leverage over
the entirety of Iraq by shutting down vital services. In addition, all
the companies that do business within Iraq are almost all controlled
by the IRGC. With Iraqi patronage, the IRGC will have the ability
to fund their own operations in order to garner more influence and
power within the foreign realm.
Syria
With Syria suffering from a crumbling infrastructure due to their
civil war, Iran has offered to aid in reconstruction efforts. IRGC
controlled companies have spearheaded this cause, as construction
companies that are owned and operate by the IRGC have received
exclusive contracts to rebuild neighborhoods and other vital
buildings, e.g., hospitals; schools; banks; and government
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buildings. Iran and Syria have also improved trading relations, as
Iran has supplied Syria with various necessities from food to
commodities due to the limiting trade partners that Syria has from
international pressure. Trading between both countries will
continue to grow as both regimes have agreed upon on signing
exclusive trade deals. Iran has also opened a credit line into Syria
so that companies may borrow money, even though there will be
high interest rates, so that the infrastructure of Syria may be
restarted. Similar to what occurred in Iraq, Iran is profiting from
the essential victory of the Assad regime in the form of exclusive
economic agreements. Companies that will be helping Syria
rebuild are all IRGC owned, which will only increase the influence
of the IRGC even more.
Yemen
Before the Yemeni Civil war began, the Houthi rebels and Iran
have agreed upon several economic trade agreements. OF them,
there was an agreement that Iran would help reconstruct their
crippled infrastructure. They would also open up a line of credit so
that Yemeni businesses may grow, even though it would be under
high interest rates. And that there would be increased trades
between the rebels and the Iranian regime. However, because of
the attacks led by the Saudi coalition, these aforementioned trade
agreements never came to fruition. It should be noted that there is
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limited research done on the subject of economic relations between
Iran and the Houthi rebels, so further research is required within
this field.
Outlook for the Future
The research that was conducted establishes a clear correlation
between both Iran and the IRGC and their interests in foreign
countries that are destabilized in an effort to increase their own
power inflow. By using ideological influences, Iran is able to
create a societal and cultural link between countries, in which it
has the dominant position. For example, religion, specifically
Twelver Shi’ism has been a tool of influence that Iran exports to
foreign countries. IN doing so, Iran correlates its religion with its
revolutionary ideology and the necessity of the establishment of an
Islamic theocracy. The IRGC and the Iranian regime use military
soft power to destabilize the security apparatus of a country by
creating cliental states that rely on Iranian military power to
maintain the training and equipment of another military. Because
of this, the country that is being “assisted” by Iran becomes
dependent and could be coerced into maintaining pro-Iranian
relations to ensure their own security. Economic soft power is
linked to the business sector of a country. When both Iran and the
IRGC become influential in these sectors, they establish trade deals
that favor them the most; establish lines of credits with large
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interest rates; and other practices that ensure that both the IRGC
and Iran gain economically while their partner loses. If Iran is
allowed to continue this model of exploitation, then advisory states
such as Saudi Arabia will suffer because Iran will have secured the
position of regional hegemon.
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